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This paper offers a personal view of the need for and uses of theory in educational research. 
It draws on the work of two exemplary theorists to point up the epistemological role of 
theory in making research possible and making it reflexive. The second section of the paper 
deploys some recent ideas and research from class theory and class analysis to suggest some 
of the limitations of the use of social class in current educational research and some ways of 
thinking differently about class.
Introduction
Perhaps as educational researchers we need to appreciate better the work that theory does. 
To this end, I want to say something about some general theoretical influences that are 
important to me in the way I go about research, and then something more specific and 
substantive about the role of class theory in educational research. I am seeking here to 
highlight the very practical role of theory in research as a conceptual toolbox, and means 
of analysis, and a system of reflexivity.
The two theorists I find most provocative, productive and “useful” both deny and 
avoid having “a theory”—both are essentially concerned with “practice”, the practice of 
social science and social research, rather than global abstractions for their own sake. 
They are both thought of as theorists, but they saw themselves as researchers, indeed they 
are far more concerned about epistemology and its pitfalls than with theory per se, and 
with understanding how we think about the social as a starting point for thinking 
differently about the social world, thinking between existing positions, and thinking 
against mindless orthodoxies. Both sought to break epistemologically with the scientistic 
mimicry of the social sciences and find a form of research practice unencumbered by the 
naturalism of what one called “spontaneous sociology” (everyday thinking). They were 
both critically aware of the ways in which sociology constitutes the object of its 
theorising. That is, the way in which the positions we take and the concepts we use play 
their part in making-up our research objects. That we do not have direct and 
unencumbered access to a social world waiting patiently and passively to be researched 
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and known. They are also both committed to avoiding closure, their work trades in the 
possibilities of paradox, and they are against making the social more real, more orderly, 
more predictable than it is. The world as it is, as one put it, is “complicated, confused, 
impure, uncertain” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon & Passeron, 1991, p. 259). And they are 
both angry and critical, both activists and public intellectuals whose work is a form of 
“critical explanation” and a means to “sap power”. All of which confounds the 
possibilities of conventional versions of intellectual rigour. And, as it happens, they are 
both French—they are Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Their work is very different, 
but not as different as is sometimes thought. (Foucault was Bourdieu’s sponsor to the 
College de France).
As Foucault explained, his purpose is “not to formulate the global systematic theory 
which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechanisms of power ... 
to build little by little a strategic knowledge” (Foucault, 1980, p. 145) and, as Bourdieu 
often urged, he wanted his readers to read his works as “exercise books” rather than 
theories and was keen to “remind us that ‘theory’ should not be valued for its own sake” 
(Karalayali, 2004, p. 352). He felt strongly that we need to be reflexively aware of the 
implications and effects of theory in relation to the social world we conjure up in our 
work. He was indeed critical of what he called the “intellectualist bias” which always 
arises when a researcher is insufficiently critical of the “presuppositions inscribed in the 
act of thinking about the world” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 39) and the failure to 
grasp “the logic of practice” which stems from this. Indeed part of Bourdieu’s endeavour 
was to destabilise and re-invent the sociological habitus, “a system of dispositions 
necessary to the constitution of the craft of the sociologist in its universality” (Bourdieu, 
1993, p. 271). And importantly, Bourdieu sought to work between binaries rather than be 
constrained to make false choices between poles—his social model is articulated between 
objectivism (construction of a discourse within which to converse with other sociologist 
about the object) and subjectivism, his epistemology is enacted between scientism and 
theoreticism, which implies that one can grasp reality without “touching it” (Karalayali, 
2004, p. 365).
Foucault goes further; in his self awareness and his scepticism about theory and 
research, he often claimed that his books are fictions, but it is important to understand 
what he meant by that and how this was part of his own strategic struggle against the 
traditional disciplines of social science. His books are fictions “only because the power 
relations and the disciplinary establishments within which they could be validated don’t 
yet exist”  (Foucault, 1980, pp. 192-193). In writing outside of the expectations and 
constraints of intellectualism, his work had no framework of disciplinary evaluation 
within which it could be judged—and indeed Foucault worked constantly to avoid being 
captured by and within the disciplines of social science, which he saw as limits to the 
possibilities of thought. 
Am I a Foucauldian then—Clearly no! Am I a Bourdieurian—maybe a failed one!
—I do not seek to be anything. I do not want to mimic, or emulate these writers, even if I 
possibly could. I want to learn from them, I want to be challenged by them and to 
struggle with the frustrations to certainty that they present. I want to be made 
uncomfortable and not “let half-truths and or received ideas steer me along” (Said, 1994, 
p. 17)—perhaps want is the wrong verb, rather I constantly confront discomforts that I 
cannot ignore.
But I also want to experience and hold on to those moments when I read a line or a 
paragraph, and it is like the author stretches a hand out from the page towards my own 
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hand, and I think yes, I think that too, that expresses something that I have never been 
able to quite capture into words.
Foucault in particular made an art form out of discomforting his readers and would-
be emulators. He constantly disavowed and distanced himself from his own work. As 
noted already he denied any attempt on his part to construct a theoretical system or 
holistic account on the social. His work is full of discontinuities, diversions and evasions. 
In style as in substance he sought to work outside and against the conventions of 
“normal” rigour. Michael Walzer (1988, p. 193) captures and responds to this in an 
interesting way when he explains that his own rendition of Foucault’s critical stance 
requires that he “adopt a ‘constructivist’ position”.
Since Foucault never presented it [his critical stance] in anything like a systematic fashion, I 
shall put it together out of the later (and more political) books and interviews, ignoring 
passages that I don’t understand and refusing to live at the heights of his flamboyance. 
In other words, quite rightly, Walzer reads Foucault as a “writerly text”, as a text which 
invites the reader to participate in the making of meaning rather than simply be subject to 
it. Foucault’s elusivity creates spaces for the reader and user of his work to be creative 
and to be adventurous.
In a different sense one of the charms of Bourdieu is that it is possible to see the 
flaws and discontinuities in his work, as well as its clear evolution over time; although 
the mis-ordering of his French publications when translated into English does not always 
make this easy. In his efforts to be absolutely clear about the grounds of his work, he 
reveals, rather than obscures, as is the case in most social scientific writings, its limits, 
omissions and inconsistencies. Bourdieu was also very much a pragmatic realist!
All of this is demanding and liberating in equal measure. Bourdieu and Foucault 
offer a form of social scientific practice and thinking which is not limited to the 
discursively constructed boxes, categories and divisions of modernist thinking.  But 
taking them and the way in which they work seriously does not involve giving up what 
we believe or find useful or productive. It does not mean becoming “something”, 
swapping new orthodoxies for old, rather it means struggling against the complacencies 
and comforts of “being something”, of orthodoxy for its own sake1. And all of this in turn 
requires, as Edward Said (1994) argued, “both commitment and risk, boldness and 
vulnerability” (p. 10), and it means accepting that work is always “unfinished and 
necessarily imperfect” (p. 17) despite increasingly frenetic demands for definitive 
statements and firm and conclusive “findings”.
It also means giving up on spontaneous empiricism, casual epistemologies, theory 
by numbers, and constantly struggling against the governmentalities of scientism to find a 
proper rigour, a thoughtful reflexive and practical rigour—a rigour that goes beyond the 
niceties and safety of technique to find a form of epistemological practice that is not 
simply self-regarding.
So I will finish with a very brief attempt to illustrate how these fascinations, 
discomforts and avoidances play upon and within my work. And I will do that in relation 
to my very modernist preoccupation with social class, a preoccupation that Bourdieu 
would have little problem with but one that would be anathema to Foucault. I will draw 
on some of the influences that played their part in the writing of Class Strategies and the 
Education Market (Ball, 2003) , which both uses and tries to move beyond the existing 
body of sociological class theory. The book was “written between rather than against” 
existing work, it differs from rather than opposes, and certainly does not try “to reduce 
others to silence” (Foucault, 1974, p. 17)2 and it is a strategic, unfinished text. 
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What do recent developments in class theory, and more generally Bourdieu’s 
writing on class have to say to and offer to education researchers? Three things perhaps.
1. Certainly in a technical and theoretical sense the class categories used in 
much educational research seem crude and ineffectual—significant feminist and 
revisionist critiques of class analysis are ignored, out-moded models of class, and 
class relations are repeatedly rehearsed, changes in the class structure are 
unattended to and the complexities of classed families are bracketed away (despite 
the fact that these have a particular and enduring relevance to educational issues). 
For the most part, in education research on social class and “in conventional class 
analyses” families “appear like phantoms, clearly implicated in the 
intergenerational transmission of social and economic advantage, and yet assuming 
a unitary status lacking in real social content” (Witz, 1995,  p. 45). Generally 
educational research tends to settle for what is available rather than what is 
meaningful, often settling for surrogate indicators, like Free School Meals, which 
have litte sensible relation to class analysis. The complexities of cross-class, and 
dual-income and trans-national family structures are conveniently avoided, and 
Rosemary Crompton’s warning that “it is not possible to construct a single measure 
which could successfully capture all the elements going to make up social class—or 
even structured social inequality” (Crompton, 1998, p. 114) is constantly ignored. 
Generally the nuances and ambiguities of class positionings are set aside—while as 
Bourdieu (1987 p. 13) argues “In the reality of the social world, there are no more 
clear-cut boundaries, no more absolute breaks, than there are in the physical 
world”. Social boundaries, he suggests, can be thought of as “imaginary planes” or 
a more appropriate image “would be that of a flame whose edges are in constant 
movement, oscillating around a line or surface” (p. 13). Consequently it is often 
difficult to read classed individuals as though their experiences were transparent 
concomitants of the social category they are allocated to. Educational research does 
this as normal practice. The ontological status of class is not “ready-made in 
reality” (Wacquant, 1991, p. 57) but is routinely taken to be so.
2. Further, with notable exceptions, developments in class theory, as in the 
analysis of class fractions  (see Vincent, Ball & Kemp, 2004), debates concerning 
an under-class, and work on class and space—both in local and global terms, are 
systematically neglected. Educational research can sometimes be read, in class 
terms, as though it is stuck in the 1950s. Whereas almost all of the contributors to 
the class debate emphasise the need to renew class analysis “in the context of 
current social changes” (Butler, 1995, p. 35). Class analysis works as Crompton 
(1995, p. 74) argues within “a very fluid and rapidly developing situation”, and she 
goes on to say, “this does not mean we are witnessing the end of class analysis ... 
Rather ... the best way forward is to explore a more flexible approach”. In particular 
recent work in class theory and class analysis emphasises the interactions of space 
and social networks in class formation and reproduction. The point is that class is 
not the same everywhere. It does not mean the same thing in Durham, as it does in 
Cornwall, as it does in London or Adelaide. Butler (2003) for example, explores 
what he terms “the Metropolitan Habitus” and Savage, Bagnall and Longhurst 
(2004) explore four different narratives of middle class life in four different areas of 
Manchester, which includes differences in the involvement of the research families 
with their children’s education (Bagnall, Longhurst et al. 2003). Class meanings are 
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inflected by culture and place. Class identities are “located” and “developed 
through the networked geography of places articulated together” (Savage, Bagnall 
& Longhurst, 2004, p. 208). Or in Bourdieu’s words “Social agents, and also things 
insofar as they are appropriated by them and therefore constituted as properties, are 
situated in a place in social space …” (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 134). We know ourselves 
and relate to others from where we belong, or sometimes out of a sense of not 
belonging, of feeling out of place. The spaces and places of class exist in several 
senses which have a particular relevance to education. Schools themselves are 
classed spaces, within which some students feel at home and others can be 
distinctly uncomfortable. Education is a trajectory through spaces of learning and 
our movement through these spaces can be re-affirming of who we are or be part of 
becoming different, and a process of class dis-identification (see Mahony & 
Zmroczek, 1997). What we call social mobility is also typically of form of spatial 
mobility and exposes those who are mobile to the possibilities of not belonging (see 
Reay, David et al., 2005) and a variety of joys and sufferings and renunciations. We 
may even learn to occupy space and move through it differently as our bodily hexis 
changes to accommodate to what is “strict and sober, discreet and severe” 
(Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 338) and as we seek stature and substance, and to display a 
sense of entitlement. The geography of class and education can also be seen at the 
present point in time in the interplay of parental choice, school admissions criteria 
and house prices. Classes use and mis-use space differently, sometimes to their 
advantage, as a resource and sometimes they are ‘trapped’ within damaging spatial 
identities. Spatial resources are unevenly distributed, and some can be deployed to 
ensure access to schools of a certain kind, that is, to those places where there are 
others “like us”. In some circumstances the middle classes are able to colonise 
schools (Butler et al., 2003) and concomitantly the process of gentrification is 
inflected by the availability of particular kinds of school places in particular 
locations. (See Taylor (2002) on the geography of school choice). Indeed the 
relations of education and social class do not make much sense without a sense of 
space and place but much educational research which deploys social class 
categories floats free of such material under-pinnings. 
3. Far too little attention is paid to class practices or given to thinking about 
the meaning of class—what class is. Bourdieu provides cautions and insights in 
both respects, and the recent work of Mike Savage, Beverley Skeggs, Diane Reay, 
Tim Butler and Paul Connolly, all influenced by Bourdieu, to a greater or lesser 
extent, illustrates what can be done with class by moving beyond the “theoreticist 
illusion” (Bourdieu, 1987 p. 7) of “class on paper” to take seriously how class “gets 
done”. Class “is something that happens (and it can be showed to have happened) 
in a human relationship” (Thompson, 1980, pp. 8-9). Class is an identity and a 
lifestyle, and a set of perspectives on the social world and relationships in it, 
marked by varying degrees of reflexivity. Identities, lifestyles, perspectives and 
relationships are “constituted in the course of collective history” and “acquired in 
the course of individual history”, which “function in their practical state” 
(Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 467). Class, in this sense, is productive and reactive. It is an 
identity based upon modes of being and becoming and forms of distinction that are 
realised and reproduced in specific social locations as noted already. We “think” 
and are “thought by” class. It is about being something and not being something 
else. It is relational. Class is also a trajectory, a path through space and time, a 
5
“history of transactions” (Walzer, 1984). We are not always the same, or always 
able to be the same, as the world around us changes. “Real world classes are 
constantly being constructed around us, people are constantly doing class” 
(Connell, 1983, p. 148). Our current sense of who we are may be deeply invested in 
once having been someone different or wanting to be someone else in the future. 
Similar class positions are held and experienced differently, and have different 
histories. Class positions and perspectives are produced from and invested with the 
traces of earlier choices, improvisations and opportunities, as well as being 
inflected by chance. Transactions are cumulative: “aspects of action and interaction 
are constantly being negotiated, reformulated, modified” (Devine, 1997, p. 9). Each 
new choice or point of decision-making is confronted with particular assets or 
capitals (economic, social and cultural) in hand, to be exchanged or invested; and 
for an individual or a family volumes of capital may be “increasing, decreasing or 
stationary” (Bourdieu, 1986a, p. 120). Advantages in the form of capitals can be 
stored and accumulated for future use (Lee, 1993). In other words, I take class to be 
dynamic and emergent, as Savage (2000, p. 69) puts it, “people now have to 
achieve their class positions”. As such, reproduction is never guaranteed and 
mobility, up or down, is always possible. Such mobility is both contingently and 
strategically dependent. Class and class inequalities need to treated and “understood 
dynamically” (Savage, 2000, p. 69), as “a longitudinal process rather than a cross-
sectional one”, but without losing a sense of the relative stability of class relations
—stable and static are not the same. All this is about how class is achieved and 
maintained and enacted rather than something that just is! Class is realised and 
struggled over in the daily lives of families and institutions, in consumption 
decisions, as much as in the processes of production, and particularly at moments of 
“crisis” and contradiction as parents think about the wellbeing and happiness and 
futures of their offspring. Class is about “knowing” how to act at these defining 
moments (see Devine, 2004)  
Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to make a case for the urgent necessity for theory in 
educational research and research training; its crucial role in epistemological decision-
making; in ensuring the conceptual robustness of conceptual categories; and in providing 
a method for reflexivity—that is, for understanding the social conditions of the 
production of knowledge. I also suggested the importance of the violence that theory 
does, as a reflexive tool within research practice, its role in challenging conservative 
orthodoxies and closure, parsimony and simplicity—that is the role of theory in retaining 
some sense of the obduracy and complexity of the social. Much of what passes for 
educational research is hasty, presumptive and immodest. We constantly over-estimate 
our grasp on the social world and under-estimate our role in its management. The paper 
also offered a short and rather loose example of the useful work that theory can do in 
relation to categories like social class—categories which otherwise lie moribund and 
unproblematised within research practice. 
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1NOTES
 As C. Wright-Mills (1963 p. 12) put it a long time ago: “Fresh perception now involves the capacity to continually 
unmask and smash the stereotypes of vision and intellect which modern communications [i.e. modern systems of 
representation] swamp us.”.
2 Furthermore, no closure is sought or claimed, it is intended to be read as a set of statements to be worked on. It was a 
book written throughout with the firm idea in mind that it would have to be re-written, that another book would follow. 
Part of the exercise of analysis of class in the book is about “appraising concepts as possibilities for future thinking” 
(Colebrook, 2000, p. 5) and it is an “exercise in making things intelligible” (Parkin, 1979, p. 115). It seeks, as Bourdieu 
urges, to develop a set of concepts which are “polymorphic, supple and adaptable, rather than defined, calibrated and 
used rigidly” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 23). 
